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TEN QUESTIONS ON GAY RIGHTS AND 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
Wilson R. Huhn
*
 
 
 Professor Dent has made careful and thorough arguments against 
gay rights.1  His work deserves serious consideration and a serious 
response.   
 Our first task is to clear away the brush, to clarify the issues, to 
establish those points upon which Professor Dent and I both agree, so 
that we can more clearly understand precisely where we disagree.  For 
that purpose I have prepared a series of ten questions that will 
progressively narrow the issues concerning gay rights and free exercise 
rights until we come to the principal point upon which Professor Dent 
and I disagree – the definition and application of the principle of 
equality.   
 
*  B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; C. Blake McDowell, Jr., Professor 
of Law, University of Akron School of Law.  I dedicate this essay to my sister, Elisabeth, who 
exemplifies courage and devotion. 
 1. See George W. Dent, Jr., “How Does Same-Sex Marriage Threaten You?,” 59 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 233 (2007) [hereinafter How Does Same-Sex Marriage Threaten You?]; George W. Dent, Jr., 
Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious Freedom, 95 KY. L.J. 553 (2007) [hereinafter 
Civil Rights for Whom?].  For other recent scholarship on gay rights and freedom of religion, see, 
e.g., Ben Schuman, Gods and Gays: Analyzing the Same-Sex Marriage Debate From a Religious 
Perspective, 96 GEO. L.J. 2103 (2008); Note, First Amendment – California Supreme Court Holds 
That Free Exercise of Religion Does Not Give Fertility Doctors Right to Deny Treatment to 
Lesbians. – North Coast Women‟s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior Court, 
189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008), 122 HARV. L. REV. 787 (2008). 
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TEN QUESTIONS 
1.  IS THERE A FREE EXERCISE OBJECTION TO THE DECISION IN 
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS?2  IN OTHER WORDS, DO THE MAJORITY OF THE 
VOTERS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE TO ENACT THEIR RELIGIOUS 
BELIEFS INTO LAW?   
 No.  To take such a position would be to confuse the rights of the 
individual with the power of the state – it confounds private action with 
state action.  The difference between private action and state action is of 
fundamental constitutional importance.   
 In this country, individuals have the right to freedom of religion.  
As individuals, we have an absolute right to believe whatever we want in 
matters of religion.3  But when legislators enact statutes or the voters 
enact law by way of referendum, we cross a line from individual action 
to state action, and that changes the result under the Constitution, 
because the government does not have the right to the Free Exercise of 
Religion.  To the contrary, the Establishment Clause4 prohibits the 
government from acting on religious impulses.5   
 The Supreme Court expressly and emphatically ruled on this 
question in 1963 in the case of School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp.6  In that case, the Court struck down a state law that required 
public school officials, at the beginning of each school day, to read 
 
 2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute making oral or anal intercourse 
between people of the same sex a crime). 
 3. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (“Thus the [First] Amendment 
embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and freedom to act.  The first is absolute but, in the 
nature of things, the second cannot be.”). 
 4. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.”). 
 5. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (“[T]o withstand 
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary 
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”). 
 6. Id.  (striking down a state law and a school board rule requiring the reading of Bible 
verses or the Lord‟s Prayer in the public schools). 
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passages from the Bible to their students.7  Writing for eight justices, 
Justice Tom Clark stated: “[w]hile the Free Exercise Clause clearly 
prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to 
anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of 
the State to practice its beliefs.”8   
 2.  IS THERE A FREE EXERCISE OBJECTION TO THE DECISIONS OF THE 
SUPREME COURTS OF MASSACHUSETTS9 AND CALIFORNIA10 THAT 
RECOGNIZED A RIGHT TO SAME SEX MARRIAGE UNDER THEIR STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS?   
 Following the same reasoning set forth above in answer to 
question number one, the majority of the people of a State do not have 
the right, under the Free Exercise Clause, to enact their beliefs into law.  
There may be other reasons advanced for excluding gay and lesbian 
couples from the institution of marriage,11 but as Justice O‟Connor stated 
 
 7. See id. at 224 (finding the mandatory reading of Bible passages in the public schools to be 
a violation of the First Amendment).  
 8. Id. at 226. 
 9. Goodridge v. Dep‟t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (finding that the 
state may not “deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two 
individuals of the same sex who wish to marry.”). 
 10. Press Release, Judicial Council of California, California Supreme Court Rules in Marriage 
Cases (May 15, 2008) (http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR26-08.PDF) 
(“California legislative and initiative measures limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violate the 
state constitutional rights of same-sex couples and may not be used to preclude same-sex couples 
from marrying.” (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008))). 
 11. The principal reason offered by Professor Dent for opposing same sex marriage is the 
protection of children.  See How Does Same-Sex Marriage Threaten You?, supra note 1, at 240-45.  
I agree with Professor Dent that marriage confers substantial benefits on children.  In light of this 
fact, why would we deny the benefits that legal recognition of the family would confer upon the 
children of gay and lesbian couples?  
Professor Dent states that gay and lesbian couples must not be permitted to marry because they 
cannot produce biological children with each other.  See id. at 240-41.  Professor Dent states: 
If a + b = a, then b = 0.  Designate a loving, committed relationship between 
two people as "a."  Assume that a homosexual relationship is just as likely as 
a heterosexual relationship to qualify as such a relationship.  Heterosexual 
relationships, however, have a second quality which homosexual 
relationships lack: the capacity for reproduction.  Designate that quality "b."  
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in Lynch v. Donnelly,12 the Constitution “requires that a government 
activity have a secular purpose.”13  By itself, “conformity with religious 
 
By saying that homosexual and heterosexual relationships are equally 
valuable, then, the [New Jersey Supreme Court] is saying that a + b = a, and 
that "b," the capacity to reproduce, is worth nothing, valueless.  
It is certainly true that gay and lesbian couples cannot create children by means of intercourse.  In 
this respect they are the same as infertile couples who constitute approximately seven percent of all 
married couples.  See Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ (last visited Apr. 3, 
2009).  Furthermore, like infertile couples, gay and lesbian couples can adopt or use reproductive 
technology to have children.  And, if having children is an indispensable reason for marrying, then 
why do we let married couples use birth control?  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(upholding the constitutional right of married couples to use contraception).  And why do we allow 
couples who are my age (fifty-nine) to get married? 
Professor Dent also argues that if gays and lesbians are admitted to the institution of marriage, 
heterosexual couples will desert the institution – they will simply not marry.  See George W. Dent, 
Jr., Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 419, 425-26 (2004) (predicting 
that heterosexual couples would lose interest in marriage if same-sex marriage were recognized).  I 
doubt that would happen.  When interracial marriages were recognized in Loving v. Virginia, there 
was no overt movement among white racists to abandon the institution of marriage, and I predict 
that if same-sex marriages are recognized, people of all beliefs will still seek the economic, legal, 
and emotional benefits of state-sanctioned marriage.  388 U.S. 1 (1967).  Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has held that the government may not enact laws merely because they reflect the negative 
attitudes of people towards an unpopular group.  See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,  473 U.S. 
432, 448 (1985) (“[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly 
cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally 
retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.  It is plain that the 
electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could not order city action violative of 
the Equal Protection Clause, and the City may not avoid the strictures of that Clause by deferring to 
the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body politic.” (citation omitted)). 
I suspect that the real reason for denying equal marriage rights to gays and lesbians is simply that 
same sex marriage does not comport with traditional notions of morality.  However, in Lawrence 
the Supreme Court found that traditional views of morality are insufficient to justify a law making 
gay and lesbian intercourse a crime.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) 
(Kennedy, J.) (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither 
history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.” 
(quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)); id. at 582 (O‟Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Moral 
disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to 
satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 12. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (upholding the inclusion of a nativity scene as part of a 
municipal holiday display). 
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doctrine” is not a valid justification to support the enactment of any 
law.14   
3.  DO INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR EMPLOYEES HAVE A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE TO 
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST GAYS AND LESBIANS IN GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYMENT OR SERVICES?   
 If a government official were to fire an employee, dismiss a juror, 
or refuse to issue a drivers license to a citizen for religious reasons there 
would be a clear-cut violation of the Establishment Clause.  As an 
individual, a person may exercise the right to freedom of religion but, as 
a government official, a person must act in a manner that is neutral with 
respect to religion.15   
 
 13. Id. at 690 (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (“The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that 
a government activity have a secular purpose.”). 
 14. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The legitimacy of secular 
legislation depends instead on whether the State can advance some justification for its law beyond 
its conformity to religious doctrine.”). 
 15. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (stating that the First 
Amendment “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and 
non-believers”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)  (referring to 
the “wholesome „neutrality‟” created by the interplay of the Establishment Clause (prohibiting the 
government from officially supporting religion) and the Free Exercise Clause (prohibiting the 
government from interfering with religious practice)); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 
860 (2005) (“The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the „First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.‟” 
(citations omitted)). 
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4.  RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF OUR FIRST TWO QUESTIONS, WHEN 
THE COURTS ISSUE DECISIONS RECOGNIZING THE EQUAL RIGHTS OF 
GAYS AND LESBIANS, DO THESE DECISIONS, IN AND OF THEMSELVES, 
INTERFERE WITH THE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF ANY INDIVIDUAL OR 
ANY PRIVATE BUSINESS THAT BELIEVES HOMOSEXUALITY IS A SIN OR 
THAT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A SAME SEX MARRIAGE AS A VALID 
MARRIAGE?   
 No, and for a very simple reason.  Individuals and private 
organizations are not subject to the dictates of the Constitution.16  No 
matter how the Constitution is interpreted, discrimination by private 
parties becomes illegal only if the government affirmatively adopts a 
nondiscrimination statute.17   
 The next few questions in this essay explore the issue of whether 
nondiscrimination laws are constitutional when they conflict with the 
religious beliefs of individuals.   
 
 16. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (“Since the decision of this Court in the 
Civil Rights Cases, the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the 
action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly 
be said to be that of the States.  That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, 
however discriminatory or wrongful.” (citations omitted)). 
 17. See id.  The Court stated: “[w]e conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements 
standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id.  For example, if a private employer chose to discriminate on the basis 
of race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation, the Constitution would not bar such acts of 
discrimination. 
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5.  DOES EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 
OF OREGON V. SMITH18 ESTABLISH THE APPLICABLE STANDARD FOR 
EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS UNDER THE FREE 
EXERCISE CLAUSE? 
 The Smith case does indeed establish the standard for the 
constitutionality of laws under the Free Exercise Clause.  Under Smith, 
laws that are not generally applicable19 or that are not neutral with 
respect to religion20 are presumed unconstitutional and are subject to the 
strict scrutiny test,21 while laws of general application which are not 
specifically directed at religious practice are presumed constitutional and 
are subject only to the rational basis test.22   
 
 
 18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded in part by statute Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (West 2008) (upholding denial of unemployment compensation based 
on violation of state criminal statute prohibiting the use of peyote as applied to members of Native 
American Church among whom the ingestion of peyote is a religious sacrament). 
 19. See id. at 884 (“Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the 
unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally 
applicable criminal law.” (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (requiring strict scrutiny 
in all cases where a law substantially burdens religious practice))). 
 20. See id. at 877 (“It would be true, we think . . . that a State would be „prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion]‟ if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for 
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display.” (alteration in original)). 
 21. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 
(1993) (“In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases establish 
the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by 
a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular 
religious practice.  Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith.  Neutrality and 
general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one 
requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.  A law failing to satisfy these 
requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored 
to advance that interest.”). 
 22. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (“To make an individual's obligation to obey [a neutral, 
generally applicable law] contingent upon the law‟s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except 
where the State‟s interest is „compelling‟ – permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, „to become a law 
unto himself,‟ – contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.” (citation omitted)). 
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6.  IS A LAW PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION23 
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE?  IN OTHER 
WORDS, DO INDIVIDUALS AND PRIVATE BUSINESSES HAVE A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE TO 
DISCRIMINATE AMONG THEIR EMPLOYEES, CUSTOMERS, OR TENANTS ON 
THE BASIS OF RELIGION?   
 I would contend that laws that forbid discrimination on the basis 
of religion are “neutral” with respect to religion and do not specifically 
target the exercise of religion.  However, even if the courts were to find 
that nondiscrimination laws are not “neutral” and that they were subject 
to strict scrutiny,24 they would still be found constitutional, because 
these laws are necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest – 
the interest of the state in removing religious barriers to advancement in 
the workplace and the marketplace.25  Businesses do not have a 
constitutional right to refuse to hire or serve someone because of their 
religion, nor do homeowners have a constitutional right to refuse to sell 
their property to someone for the same reason.  These nondiscrimination 
laws are perfectly constitutional, even though they prohibit individuals 
from preferring people of their own religious faith.   
 
 23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2009) (“It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer – to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual‟s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . 
. . .”). 
 24. See Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not 
neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”). 
 25. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (“[A]cts of invidious 
discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause 
unique evils that government has a compelling interest to prevent . . . .”). 
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7.  WHEN A SUPERVISOR REPEATEDLY EXPRESSES DISAPPOINTMENT 
CONCERNING A SUBORDINATE‟S ATTENDANCE OR NONATTENDANCE AT 
A PARTICULAR CHURCH, COULD THAT BE HELD TO CONSTITUTE 
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION? 
 Findings of employment discrimination based on speech alone, 
apart from any discriminatory conduct, present difficult problems under 
the First Amendment.26  So long as the coworker‟s speech does not 
constitute “fighting words” or “true threats,” it is fully protected under 
the First Amendment.27  But, just as no one has the right to disrupt a 
classroom, we may also prevent someone from disrupting the workplace.  
For example, I cannot be sent to jail merely because I disagree with you 
on matters of religion, disparage your beliefs, or persistently seek to 
convert you.  But if I do these things at work – if I am constantly asking 
you to accept Jesus as your Lord and Savior, or Mohammed as the true 
Prophet, and particularly if I am a supervisor – then at some point the 
law will conclude that I am creating a “hostile environment” for people 
of other faiths and that I am guilty of discriminating on the basis of 
religion.28  Even by itself speech is capable of creating a hostile 
 
 26. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious 
Accommodation Law, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 57 (2001) (calling for greater protection of freedom of 
speech under nondiscrimination laws); id. at 69 (disagreeing with the position of the EEOC, stating: 
“the government has no business suppressing our ideas, whether religious or political, and whether 
or not they are „disparaging‟ (the EEOC's term), are made „for the purpose of exposing [another 
religion] to contempt and ridicule‟ (Chandler‟s test), or fail to exhibit adequate sensitivity to 
[another‟s] feelings.‟” (footnote omitted) (alterations in original)). 
A clearer case is presented when the employer not only proselytizes his employees but treats them 
differently based upon their religion.  See Cline v. Auto Shop, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. 2000) 
(upholding claim of non-believing employee under state law prohibiting discrimination in 
employment because of religion when employer conditioned pay raises and work assignments on 
attendance at employer‟s church). 
 27. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding the conviction of the 
defendant for uttering “fighting words”); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (upholding statute 
prohibiting the burning of a cross with the intent to intimidate other persons). 
 28. See Volokh, supra note 26, at 58 n.3 (collecting authorities supporting the proposition that 
excessive proselytizing constitutes harassment).  
Professor Dent cites Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2004) as an example of a case 
where an employee‟s religious rights were trampled upon.  In that case, a supervisor, Bodett, had 
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told a subordinate, Carson, during a performance review that “she would be disappointed if Carson 
were dating another woman, but happy if she were dating a man.”  See id. at 741; Dent, Civil Rights 
for Whom?, supra note 1, at 621-23.  The supervisor was fired for violating company policy 
prohibiting harassment of other employees on the basis of “race, color, religion, sexual orientation, 
national origin, age, disability or veteran status.”  Bodett, 366 F.3d at 741.  Bodett sued her former 
employer for discriminating against her on the basis of religion.  See id.at 739-40.  The court denied 
Bodett‟s claim because she had failed to demonstrate that she had been treated differently than any 
other employee would have been treated  in making statements of this kind during a performance 
review.  See id. at 746.  Professor Dent also objects to the result in Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 
358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004).  See Dent, Civil Rights for Whom?, supra note 1, at 624-26.  In that 
case, in response to a company campaign celebrating diversity and promoting HP‟s official policy 
emphasizing the importance of showing respect for fellow employees, Peterson chose to 
prominently display Bible verses calling homosexuality an “abomination” and stating that anyone 
who commits these acts “shall surely be put to death.”  Peterson, 358 F.3d at 601-02.  As a result, 
the company terminated Peterson‟s employment.  See id. at 602.  Peterson sued HP on the ground 
that HP was discriminating against him on the basis of religion and had failed to make reasonable 
accommodation for his religious beliefs.  See id. at 601.  The court denied Peterson‟s claim, again 
on the ground that he was treated no differently than any other employee would have been treated in 
making statements of this nature.  See id. at 605 (“Peterson offered no evidence . . . that would 
support a reasonable inference that his termination was the result of disparate treatment on account 
of religion.”).  The court also ruled that HP need not accommodate Peterson‟s actions because to do 
so would constitute an “undue hardship” on the employer who was seeking to create a positive work 
environment.  See id. at 608.  In objecting to the results in these cases, Professor Dent is essentially 
arguing in favor of individual immunity from nondiscrimination laws for religiously-based 
expressions of intolerance.   
Neither Bodett nor Peterson could claim that their employers violated their constitutional rights to 
freedom of expression or freedom of religion because private employers are not subject to the 
dictates of the Constitution.  See supra notes 16 and 17.  Nor is it reasonable to contend that under 
the civil rights laws religiously-based expressions of intolerance must be treated differently than 
opinions that spring from moral or political considerations.  See Volokh, supra note 26, at 59-60 
(“[F]rom a Free Speech Clause perspective, religious harassment law stands or falls with racial and 
sexual harassment law, and vice versa. If some religiously offensive statements are protected by the 
Free Speech Clause, then the same must go for racially or sexually offensive statements. 
Conversely, if racial or sexual harassment law is categorically immune from Free Speech Clause 
attack, then religious harassment law must trump free speech too.”).   
Professor Dent expresses concern that if the results in Bodett and Peterson are followed, then it may 
become unlawful for employees to make any statements concerning religion in the workplace; that 
even to identify oneself as a Christian, Muslim, or Jew connotes opposition to homosexuality.  See 
Dent, Civil Rights for Whom?, supra note 1, at 626.  I agree with Professor Dent that if an employer 
were to fire an employee merely because he or she disclosed his or her religion or posted the Ten 
Commandments that this would constitute discrimination on the basis of religion.  I disagree with 
his suggestion that disclosure of one‟s religion or anything in the Ten Commandments is at all 
equivalent to the expressions of intolerance exemplified by Bodett and Peterson. 
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environment.29  However, the same law that prohibits discrimination in 
the workplace also requires employers to make reasonable 
accommodation for their employees‟ religious observance or practice.30  
People have the right to express themselves on matters of religion, but 
their co-workers also have the right to freedom from harassment.   
8.  UNDER SMITH, IS A STATE LAW PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION ON THE 
BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FREE 
EXERCISE CLAUSE?   
 State laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation are laws of general application and, accordingly, under Smith 
they must be evaluated under the rational basis test, not the strict 
scrutiny test.31  Under the rational basis test, these kinds of laws are 
constitutional so long as they have any tendency to achieve a legitimate 
state interest.32 
 
 29. See supra note 28. 
 30. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(j) (West 2009). 
 31. See North Coast Women‟s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior Court, 
189 P.3d 959, 966 (Cal. 2008) (finding the California law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation to be “a valid and neutral law of general applicability” (quoting Dep’t of Human 
Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990))); but see Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 
2006) (holding that federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) required application of 
“strict scrutiny” of  federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act as applied to age discrimination 
suit brought by Methodist minister forced to retire at the age of seventy).  Ironically, state laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are evaluated under the rational basis 
test while, because of RFRA, federal nondiscrimination laws are evaluated under strict scrutiny 
when they impose a substantial burden on a person‟s free exercise of religion. 
 32. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding 1964 
Civil Rights Act).  The Court stated: 
Nor does the Act deprive appellant of liberty or property under the Fifth 
Amendment. The commerce power invoked here by the Congress is a 
specific and plenary one authorized by the Constitution itself. The only 
questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial 
discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, 
whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and 
appropriate. 
Id. at 258. 
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 Laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
easily pass the rational basis test.  Nondiscrimination laws are adopted to 
create a more productive working environment and to make the 
maximum use of each person‟s talents and abilities, thus increasing the 
productivity of our farms, our factories, our stores, and our professions, 
which in turn increases the happiness and well-being of everyone in our 
society.33  This clearly satisfies the rational basis test.   
9.  EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS, LIKE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, 
ADVOCACY GROUPS, AND POLITICAL PARTIES, ENJOY IMMUNITY FROM 
NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS.  COULD A FOR-PROFIT BUSINESS QUALIFY 
AS AN EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION? 
 Under the First Amendment, expressive associations do not have 
to employ persons or allow them to become members if their 
employment or membership would interfere with the ability of the 
organization to convey its message.34  Accordingly, the Catholic Church 
is not required to ordain women as priests,35 the Democratic Party is not 
required to allow Republicans to vote in their primaries,36 and the Ku 
Klux Klan is not required to admit blacks to membership.37   
 
 33. See supra note 25.  In Smith, the Court explained why laws of general applicability should 
prevail over matters of individual conscience, stating that the “unavoidable consequence of 
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself 
or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious 
beliefs.”  494 U.S. at 890. 
 34. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“There can be no clearer example 
of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the 
group to accept members it does not desire.”). 
 35. See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding a priest‟s suit against 
Catholic diocese under Title VII alleging racial discrimination in employment barred by “ministerial 
exception” to Title VII); see also 42 U.S.C.A, § 2000e-1(a) (West 2009) (exempting religious 
organizations from the federal law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion). 
 36. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (holding state law opening 
primary elections to voters from other political parties violates the party‟s First Amendment right to 
political association). 
 37. See Ku Klux Klan, The Knights Party,  http://www.kkk.bz/howtoget.htm (last visited  
Apr. 3, 2009) (“We emphasize ONE requirement for every person who decides to associate with 
The Knights, and that is that they conduct themselves with Christian character.  We want our 
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  There are some practical obstacles that a for-profit business 
would face in attempting to qualify as an expressive organization.  First, 
it would be necessary for the organization to express a specific 
message.38  If an organization keeps its message secret, it is not an 
expressive association.  Second, these businesses would be ineligible for 
the tax breaks and other benefits accorded nonprofit charitable 
organizations,39 a status that religious institutions and advocacy groups 
normally consider crucial for their survival.  But, most importantly, both 
historically and presently the Constitution has not been interpreted to 
mean that businesses that are open to the public have a constitutional 
right to discriminate – quite the opposite, in fact.40  As Justice Black 
 
Klansmen and Klanswomen to live their lives as honorable, decent, dignified white people.”).
The Imperial Klans of America  are rather more direct: “[i]f you are not of the White race, this web 
site is not for the likes of YOU!  We reserve the right of free speech to state our views whether our 
enemies like it or not.  The IKA hates: Muds, spics, kikes and niggers.”  Imperial Klans of America, 
http://kkkk.net/home.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). 
The Klan, of course, supports the repeal of nondiscrimination laws.  See Ku Klux Klan, 
The Knights Party Platform, http://www.kkk.bz/program.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (“Restoring 
individual freedom to Christian America.-  People should be allowed to hire who they want, live 
where they want and practice the Christian faith as they please.  Likewise people should be able to 
sell to whom they want, rent to whom they want and socialize and conduct business with who they 
want. The government should not interfere with the everyday lives of white Christian Americans.”). 
 38. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts 
qualified as an expressive organization because they seek to instill values in youth, and stating: “[t]o 
determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment's expressive associational right, we 
must determine whether the group engages in „expressive association.‟  The First Amendment's 
protection of expressive association is not reserved for advocacy groups.  But to come within its 
ambit, a group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private.”). 
 39.   See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding denial of tax-
exempt status to university that had religiously motivated racially discriminatory admissions 
policy); id. at 604 (“The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. . . .  [T]he Government 
has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education - 
discrimination that prevailed, with official approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation's history. 
That governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on 
petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs.” (footnote omitted)).  Cf. Corp. of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (ruling that 
the statutory exemption of religious organizations from the federal nondiscrimination law did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.). 
 40. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding 1964 Civil Rights Act 
against a family owned restaurant that wished to discriminate on the basis of race); Romer v. Evans, 
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stated in Marsh v. Alabama,41 “[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, 
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his 
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of 
those who use it.”42   
10.  IS “EQUALITY” UNDER THE CONSTITUTION MEASURED SOLELY BY 
REFERENCE TO TRADITION AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY, OR IS IT A 
BROADER CONCEPT? 
 We now reach the issue where Professor Dent and I share a 
profound disagreement: the meaning of “equality” under the 
Constitution.  Professor Dent has written that the principle of equality – 
the idea that persons who are alike must be treated alike – is an “empty” 
concept that has no inherent meaning.43  On this point I disagree with 
him.  The principle of equality is not only central to the Constitution, but 
is also central to the American identity.   
 In my opinion, most of the legal and social problems that arise 
under the Constitution stem from the belief, held by some people, that 
they are better than other people.  They do not hate anyone.  They 
simply believe that they are superior and that the law ought to treat them 
better than the other group.44  This is true of whites who think they are 
 
517 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1996) (“At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others who „made 
profession of a public employment,‟ were prohibited from refusing, without good reason, to serve a 
customer.” (citation omitted)). 
 41. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (finding the operation of a company town to constitute state action). 
 42. Id. at 506.  See also Colleen Theresa Rutledge, Caught in the Crossfire: How Catholic 
Charities of Boston Was Victim to the Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious Freedom, 15 DUKE 
J. GENDER L. & POL‟Y 297, 306-07 (2008) (“When state power to protect the gay population 
conflicts with religious organizations' free exercise, the power of the state will change depending on 
the zone in which the religious exemption is claimed.  For example, the state's regulatory power is 
strongest in the zone of commercial affairs.  But the religious claim to an exemption is strongest in 
the zone of religious activity, such as doctrine and worship.”). 
 43. See Dent, How Does Same-Sex Marriage Threaten You?, supra note 1, at 234 (“The 
notion of equality is notoriously „empty.‟”); Civil Rights for Whom?, supra note 1, at 628 (“Nor 
does the principle of equality help.  It requires that likes be treated alike, but it does not tell us what 
things are alike.”). 
 44. On December 12, 1953, two months after he had been sworn in as Chief Justice, Earl 
Warren presided over his first conference with the other members of the Court in the case of Brown 
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superior to blacks, men who think they are superior to women, and 
heterosexuals who think they are superior to homosexuals.  People 
have often justified each of these beliefs by appeals to religion.45 
 The Declaration of Independence says that “all men are created 
equal,”46 but this principle was not included in the original Constitution 
because slavery was there,47 and the two ideas could not coexist.  
Abraham Lincoln and his followers believed that we had to bring the 
concept of equality into the Constitution,48 and I believe it was this goal 
 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  In presenting the case for discussion, Warren went 
right to the heart of the issue: 
[T]he more I‟ve read and heard and thought, the more I‟ve come to conclude 
that the basis of segregation and “separate but equal” rests upon a concept of 
the inherent inferiority of the colored race.  I don‟t see how Plessy and the 
cases following it can be sustained on any other theory.  If we are to sustain 
segregation, we also must do it upon that basis. 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 292 (1993).  For the same reason, I 
believe that the constitutionality of laws denying equal marriage rights to gay and lesbian couples 
can be sustained only upon the finding that heterosexual relationships are superior to gay and 
lesbian relationships.  
 45. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(citing  “divine ordinance” in support of the proposition that women may not serve as lawyers); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (striking down state law forbidding interracial marriage, 
and quoting trial court as stating, “[a]lmighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and 
red, and he placed them on separate continents.  And but for the interference with his arrangement 
there would be no cause for such marriages.  The fact that he separated the races shows that he did 
not intend for the races to mix.”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring) (“Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical 
standards.  Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law. See Code Theod. 9.7.6; 
Code Just. 9.9.31. See also D. Bailey, Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition 70-81 
(1975).”).  
It is also common for religious persons and atheists to acknowledge only the negative aspects of 
each other‟s worldview.  See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION 262 (2006) (“[Religion is] a 
significant force for evil in the world.”); George W. Dent, Jr., Book Review: The Stillborn God: 
Religion, Politics, and the Modern West, by Mark Lilla, 24 J.L. & RELIGION 257, 261 (2008) 
(“[A]theist regimes have often been murderous and repressive.”). 
 46. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. cl. 3 (three-fifths clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (clause 
protecting the slave trade for a period of 20 years); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (fugitive slave 
clause). 
 48. The Republican Party platform of 1860 stated that the principles of the Declaration, 
including the concept “all men are created equal,” were embodied in the Constitution. See John T. 
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that justified fighting the Civil War in which over six hundred thousand 
American soldiers died.49  By the time of the Gettysburg Address, 
Lincoln had already issued the Emancipation Proclamation,50 and the 
“unfinished work” that Lincoln spoke of at the dedication of that 
military cemetery, the “great task remaining before us” for which those 
honored dead gave “the last full measure of devotion,”51 was to make the 
ideal of equality part of our fundamental law.  After Lincoln‟s death, 
America did so by drafting, adopting, and ratifying the Fourteenth 
Amendment which says that “[n]o state shall . . .  deny to any person . . . 
the equal protection of the laws.”52  As amended, the Constitution 
instantiates the idea that all men are created equal.   
 Here is what Lincoln had to say about the principle of equality 
after Stephen Douglas claimed that the phrase “all men are created 
equal” did not include blacks:53   
 
Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29620; see generally Wilson Huhn, Abraham 
Lincoln Was a Framer of the Constitution, WASH. U. L. REV. (Slip Opinions, Mar. 12, 2009), 
http://lawreview.wustl.edu/slip-opinions/abraham-lincoln-was-a-framer-of-the-constitution/.   
 49. See DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR, at xi (2008) (estimating the number of soldiers killed in the Civil War at 620,000). 
 50. See 6 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28-30 (Roy 
Prentice Basler ed.) (1953), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/ [hereinafter 
COLLECTED WORKS] (Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863). 
 51. Lincoln stated:  
The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can 
never forget what they did here.  It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated 
here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so 
nobly advanced.  It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task 
remaining before us- that from these honored dead we take increased 
devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion- 
that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain- that 
this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom- and that 
government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from 
the earth. 
7 Id. at 22-23 (Gettysburg Address, November 19, 1863). 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 53. Douglas had claimed that in declaring “all men are created equal,” the founders “were 
speaking of British subjects on this continent being equal to British subjects born and residing in 
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I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all 
men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. . . .  
They defined with tolerable distinctness, in what respects they did 
consider all men created equal–equal in “certain inalienable rights, 
among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”  This they 
said, and this meant.  They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, 
that all were then actually enjoying that equality . . . .  They meant 
simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as 
fast as circumstances should permit.  They meant to set up a standard 
maxim for free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by 
all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never 
perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly 
spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness 
and value of life to all people . . . everywhere.54   
 In this passage Lincoln is telling us that the principle of equality 
imposes upon us a task which is always unfinished.  To understand 
equality we cannot rely solely or even mainly upon existing laws or the 
specific understanding of our ancestors, religious teaching, or what our 
parents told us in determining who is equal and who is not.55  It is 
instead our obligation under the Constitution to constantly look to this 
ideal of equality, to constantly labor for it, to constantly reexamine our 
own beliefs, our own preconceptions, our own attitudes, to consider and 
reconsider and reconsider again whether or not that person or group 
whom we thought to be inferior in fact might be our equal.  It is this idea 
more than any other that Lincoln stood for.56   
 
Great Britain . . . .”  2 COLLECTED WORKS 406 (statement of Stephen Douglas which Lincoln 
responded to in his speech of June 26, 1857). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (Kennedy, J.) (“[H]istory and tradition 
are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” 
(quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).   
 56. In ending slavery, Lincoln did not appeal to custom or tradition.  Instead he told the 
people of the United States, “[a]s our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.  We must 
disenthrall our selves, and then we shall save our country.”  5 COLLECTED WORKS 537 (Annual 
Message to Congress, December 1, 1862). 
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 Gays and lesbians are entitled to equal rights, including equal 
marriage rights, because the love that they have for each other is 
indistinguishable from the love that heterosexual men and women have 
for their partners.  Their relationships are just as valuable to themselves 
and to society – just as important and just as sacred as the love between 
heterosexual couples.  In that respect we are all created equal.   
